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1

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

CLAUDE L. HAYES,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 920850-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction by a jury
of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1990).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1992), as the appeal has
been transferred to this Court from the Utah Supreme Court (a
copy of the order of the Supreme Court is attached as Addendum
A).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Was the evidence sufficient to support a conviction

for the crime of aggravated robbery?

On appeal, this claim is

evaluated by viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the jury's verdict.

State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 378 (Utah

App. 1992); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1202 (Utah App.
1991).

Accord State v. Burk. 839 P.2d 880, 884 (Utah App. 1992).

Reversal is warranted "only when the evidence, so viewed, is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that

reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted."
Burk, 839 P.2d at 884 (quoting State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386,
1387 (Utah App- 1991)); see also State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819,
821 (Utah 1989)-

Accord State v. Vigil, 840 P.2d 788, 792-93

(Utah App. 1992) .
2.

Did the trial court properly refuse to suppress

defendant's spontaneous pre-Miranda confession after finding that
it was not the result of custodial interrogation?

"This Court

reviews the factual findings underlying the denial of a motion to
suppress evidence under a 'clearly erroneous' standard, and
reviews the trial court's conclusions of law based thereon for
correctness."

State v. Gray, 211 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, 41 (Utah

App. Apr. 22, 1993) (quoting State v. Brooks, 209 Utah Adv. Rep.
43 (Utah App. Mar. 22, 1993)); see also State v. Brown, 201 Utah
Adv. Rep. 4, 6 (Utah Nov. 30, 1992).

The ultimate question of

whether police words or actions were, under the totality of the
circumstances, so likely to evoke an incriminating response that
they constitute interrogation under Miranda is a factual
determination reviewed for clear error.

Lavton City v. Aragon,

813 P.2d 1213, 1215-16 (Utah App. 1991); see State v. Singer, 815
P.2d 1303, 1311-12 (Utah App. 1991).

But see United States v.

Wauneka, 770 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir. 1985) (the issue is a
mixed question of law and fact).

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1990):
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the
course of committing robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1601; or
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon
another.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall
be considered to be "in the course of committing a
robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during
the commission of, or in the immediate flight after the
attempt or commission of a robbery.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1990):
(1) Robbery is the unlawful and intentional
taking of personal property in the possession of
another from his person, or immediate presence, against
his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.
(2) Robbery is a felony of the second degree.
The text of any other relevant constitutional,
statutory or rule provisions pertinent to the resolution of the
issues presented on appeal is contained in the body of this
brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant Claude L. Hayes was charged by information
with one count of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1990) (R. 2-4). The jury
found defendant guilty as charged (R. 66). The court ordered
preparation of a presentence report (Trial Transcript, Volume II
[hereinafter "Tr. I or IIM] at 94), and subsequently sentenced
3

defendant to serve the statutory term of five years to life in
the Utah State Prison (R. 71-74).

Defendant timely appealed to

the Utah Supreme Court which transferred the matter to this Court
by order dated December 15, 1992 (Addendum A ) .
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are recited in the light most favorable to
the jury's verdict.

State v. Gray, 211 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (Utah

App. Apr. 22f 1993); State v. Burk, 839 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah App.
1992); see also State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819, 820 (Utah 1989).
The only robbery in Ogden, Utah, on June 16, 1991,
occurred shortly before 10:00 p.m. at the Kar Kwik convenience
store at Seventh and Washington (Tr. I at 12, 15, 117-18).
Nineteen-year-old Anthea Benally and eighteen-year-old Brent Hoth
were on duty at the time (Tr. I at 12-13, 15-16, 28-29, 61).
Defendant, a thirty-one year old black bus driver, entered the
store at a time when no other customers were present (Tr. I at
15, 187). He took some time to select a bag of chips and asked
Mrs. Benally to get him a package of cigarettes from behind the
counter (Tr. I at 15-17, 34). The store was brightly lit and
Mrs. Benally had an unobstructed view of defendant as she dealt
with him (Tr. I at 32-34).

When Mrs. Benally turned from the

counter to ring up the sale on the nearby cash register,
defendant stepped around the counter and told her, "This is a
robbery" (Tr. I at 18-19, 34). Mrs. Benally laughed at what she
thought was a joke (Tr. I at 19, 34). Defendant grabbed her arm,
threatened her with a pair of scissors and told her, "Open up the
4

till now or else I'm going to stab you and then go for your
partner" (Tr. I at 19-20, 34, 65-66).

While defendant held the

scissors only five inches from Mrs. Benally's stomach, she
struggled to open the till (Tr. I at 20-21, 65). At this point,
Hoth approached the counter from the opposite end of the store
where he had been cleaning when defendant came in (Tr. I at 15,
21, 63-65).

When the till finally opened, defendant let go of

Mrs. Benally's arm, grabbed approximately $300.00 in bills from
the open till and stuffed them in his jacket pocket (Tr. I at 2223, 66). He warned Hoth and Mrs. Benally not to call the police,
then told them "to get on your feet" (Tr. I at 23, 66). When
Mrs. Benally pointed out that they were already on their feet,
defendant turned and left the store (Tr. I at 23-24, 66).
Neither Hoth nor Mrs. Benally could see him once he exited the
store because it was so dark outside, and neither gave chase (Tr.
I at 24, 34-35, 66).
Mrs. Benally immediately phoned the police and
described the robber to them (Tr. I at 25, 36-37).x

Officers

arrived at the store within ten minutes (Tr. I at 36), and
thereafter took her to a street corner where they asked her to
1

The description she initially gave over the phone was not
made part of the record. The testimony indicated only that the
"general description" she gave on the phone included the robber's
height, skin color, and dark blue "slick" jacket (Tr. I at 37,
152). The description she later gave at the police station was
included in her written statement and was read into the record:
"He was black, late 20's, early 30's, 5'10" or 5'11", medium build,
[and had] short curly black hair. He had just a little bit of
facial hair. He was wearing a dark blue slick kind of like a rain
jacket. It had a lining [that] was light color[ed]. Dark colored,
mostly Levi's [sic]." (Tr. I at 55-56).
5

look at a suspect, subsequently identified as Melvin White (Tr. I
at 25, 38-39),

She thought White was similar to the robber in

height and age but said the robber wore a different jacket (Tr. I
at 26, 40-42, 48). Because of the lighting, she had them move
White into the headlights of the police car (Tr. I at 41-4 2, 48).
She then identified him as the robber, but told the police that
he had changed his jacket since the robbery thirty minutes
earlier (Tr. I at 25-26, 39, 42, 48). White and the store
employees were taken separately to the police station where Mrs.
Benally saw White walking down a lighted hallway (Tr. I at 42-44,
153).

She then gave a written statement to the police in which

she again indicated that she thought White was the robber (Tr. I
at 26, 43-50) .
Detective John Stubbs was in charge of the robbery
investigation and completed the initial investigation around 2:00
a.m. the morning of June 17 (Tr. I at 115, 121-22, 149). At 4:00
a.m. that morning, Gayle Herrera walked into the police station
and was taken to Detective Stubbs (Tr. I at 84, 122). She asked
him if there had been a robbery earlier that night (Tr. 122).
Ignoring her question, Stubbs told her to say what she had to say
and they'd take it from there (.id.).

She explained that earlier

that night she had been driving around with a man she had met a
couple of days earlier (Tr. I at 84-85).

They had been using

cocaine and were looking to buy more (.id.)*

They stopped "in the

back of Kar Kwik" where the man told her that he was going to go
borrow money from relatives nearby and that she should wait for
6

him in the car (Tr. I at 86-87).

He left and returned fifteen

minutes later at a run and looking sweaty and scared (Tr. I at
87-88).

When he got into the car, he had money and said, "What

did I do with them [sic] scissors?" (Tr. I at 89, 93-94).

She

gave a description of the man's Buick Riviera and three numbers
from the license plate, a description of his clothing which
included a blue jacket, and a physical description which "fit
very close" to Mrs. Benally's verbal description of the robber
(Tr. I at 85-89, 91, 93-94, 124, 125). She could not remember
the man's name, only that she thought he was called "K.K." and
had a short last name beginning with a C. (Tr. I at 91-92, 124).
The police tried that day to locate a suspect with a name
matching Herrera's description (Tr. I at 124). When their
efforts failed, Detective Stubbs called Herrera back to his
office on June 18 (Tr. I at 124-25).

She took Stubbs directly to

a Clearfield apartment rented by defendant's brother, pointed out
the gray Buick Riviera, gave him the number of the apartment she
had been at with defendant on June 16th, and, when the
registration check on the car came back with defendant's name,
verified the name as that of the man she was with on the 16th
(Tr. I at 91-93, 125-26).

Officers verified that defendant lived

there (Tr. I at 126-27).
Detective Stubbs obtained a search warrant and,
together with four other detectives, served it on the apartment
at 2:00 p.m. on June 18 (Tr. I at 125, 127-28, 163-64).

Although

defendant's brother answered the door and denied that defendant
7

was there, the officers found defendant in one of the bedrooms
(Tr. I at 128, 132, 164-65, 167). Detective Stubbs placed
defendant under arrest and began to explain to him that the
arrest was for the robbery of the Kar Kwik at Seventh and
Washington, and that the officers were there with a search
warrant to search the apartment for the coat and the scissors
that were used in the robbery (Tr. I at 132-33, 142-43, 167-69).
Defendant, appearing "quite upset", interrupted the detective to
tell him that the coat was in the closet, he would plead guilty,
and he had thrown the scissors somewhere but could not remember
where because he had been "coked up" (Tr. I at 133-34, 143, 170).
Detective Stubbs stopped defendant's statement and read him his
rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct.
1602 (1966), after which they had no further conversation (Tr. I
at 135-37, 143, 173, 204). Defendant admitted ownership of the
blue jacket retrieved from the apartment (Tr. I at 143-44; Tr. II
at 25, 28), and the jacket was positively identified by Hoth and
Mrs. Benally as the one worn by the robber and by Herrera as the
one worn by defendant on the night of June 16 (Tr. I at 22-23,
67-68, 76, 88-89).

The scissors were not found (Tr. I at 175).

Sometime between June 17 and June 22, Detective Stubbs
met with Mrs. Benally, at which time she admitted that she had
realized that the man she had initially identified "didn't even
fit the description she had just given the police, and that
description was an accurate description and she realized that she
had, in fact, screwed up and the person she had said -- Melvin

8

White — was not a good identification [sic]" (Tr. I at 182, 18586).
On June 22, 1991, Detective Stubbs arranged for a photo
spread to be shown separately to Mrs. Benally and to Hoth (Tr. I
at 68, 145, 179-80).

The spread included a picture of defendant

and six other individuals, at least two of whom were black and
had been picked up the night of the robbery (Tr. I at 145, 18081). 2

Because of Mrs. Benally's comments and the fact that

White had an alibi, White was no longer a suspect in the robbery
and his picture was not included in the photo spread (Tr. I at
160, 181, 183, 185-86).

Detective Stubbs handed the photos to

Mrs. Benally and to Hoth and asked them if anyone looked familiar
(Tr. I at 52, 68, 147, 179-80).

Both Mrs. Benally and Hoth

selected defendant's picture from those in the spread (Tr. I at
52-53, 68-69, 145-47).

They also provided positive

identifications of defendant and his jacket at trial (Tr. I at
22-23, 27, 62-63, 67-68, 76).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to
establish that he committed the Kar Kwik robbery.

The victim's

initial identification of Marvin White was fully explained to the
jury, as was her subsequent identification of defendant and her
2

The night of the robbery, White professed his innocence to
Detective Stubbs for the Kar Kwik robbery, but incriminated several
other individuals in other robberies under investigation by the
police (Tr. I at 119-20). As a result, four other individuals were
arrested that night, both because of their involvement in the other
robberies and the possibility that one or more was involved in the
Kar Kwik robbery (Tr. I at 120-21, 160-61).
9

confidence in that identification.

Aside from the positive

identification at trial of defendant and his jacket by both the
victim and her co-worker, the jury heard from Gayle Herrera.
Within hours of the robbery, she placed defendant at the location
of the robbery at the appropriate time and day, provided numerous
details concerning the robber and the robbery which had not been
revealed by the police or the victim, helped the police locate
defendant, and, at trial, positively identified defendant and his
jacket.

The jury was free to believe the testimony and, together

with an incriminating confession made by defendant when he was
placed under arrest, had sufficient evidence upon which to base
the conviction for aggravated robbery.
A search warrant was executed at the same time
defendant was arrested.

The arresting officer's brief, factual

explanation of the basis for the arrest and the authority for and
purpose of the search warrant, made immediately upon arrest and
immediately before he gave defendant the Miranda warning, did not
constitute interrogation or the functional equivalent of
interrogation.

Accordingly, the incriminating confession

volunteered by defendant before the officer read the Miranda
warning was not the result of compelling influence by the police,
and its admission did not violate either the Fifth or the
Fourteenth Amendment.

10

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL, AND THE
REASONABLE INFERENCES THEREFROM, SUPPORT THE
CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED ROBBERY
Defendant contends that the evidence presented below is
insufficient to warrant a conviction for aggravated robbery
because Mrs. Benally's identification of defendant as the robber
was unbelievable due to police coersion and the initial
identification of another suspect, and because the evidence
together with the tenuous identification does not conclusively
establish that it was defendant who committed the robbery (Br. of
App. at 13-15)•
On appeal, this claim is evaluated by viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict.
State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 378 (Utah App. 1992); State v.
Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1202 (Utah App. 1991).
Burk, 839 P.2d 880, 884 (Utah App. 1992).

Accord State v.

Reversal is warranted

"only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive
or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime of which he was convicted."

Burk, 839 P.2d at 884 (quoting

State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah App. 1991)); see also
State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819, 821 (Utah 1989).

Accord State v.

Vioil, 840 P.2d 788, 792-93 (Utah App. 1992).
Defendant does not challenge the fact that a robbery
occurred (Br. of App. at 9). He argues that the evidence did not
11

establish that he committed itf primarily because Mrs. Benally's
identification of him as the robber was unbelievable.

Defendant

claims that the victim's identification was unbelievable because
she initially identified another man as the robber, she did not
change her mind until several days after the robbery, the change
resulted from what defendant has characterized as deliberate
persuasion by the police, and her identification of defendant
from the photo spread did not allow her to compare a picture of
defendant with a picture of Marvin White.
A. The Credibility to be Given the Victim's Identification
of Defendant as the Robber is a Matter for the Jury to Decide
Defendant's challenge centers largely on Mrs. Benally's
identification testimony and attacks only the credibility of the
testimony.

He seeks to have this Court reassess the jury's

credibility determination, claiming that "the jury gave
unreasonable credibility to the testimony of Mrs. Benally in
believing her identification of the Defendant" (Br. of App. at
13).

This Court defers to the trier-of-fact's assessment of

witness credibility.

Vigil, 840 P.2d at 793 ("It is within the

province of the jury to decide whether or not to believe
witnesses in light of their prior inconsistent statements.");
State v. Wright, 744 P.2d 315, 317, 319 (Utah App. 1987); see
also State v. Baglev, 681 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1984).

The jury

is free to believe or disbelieve all or part of any witness'
testimony.

State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 904-05 (Utah App.),

cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990); see also State v.
Pierce, 722 P.2d 780, 781 (Utah 1986).
12

The jury had before it ample information surrounding
Mrs. Benally's identification of defendant from which to make its
credibility determination.

The facts behind her initial

identification of White and later identification of defendant
permeated the trial from opening statements through closing
arguments.

Mrs. Benally freely admitted her mistake, explaining

that at the time she identified White—within an hour and a half
of the robbery—she was nervous, she had not calmed down, and her
excited state contributed to her mistaken identification (Tr. I
at 26, 50-51, 58-59).

Once she had calmed down and reflected on

the situation, she realized her mistake.

In her meeting with

Detective Stubbs between June 17, when she gave her statement to
the police, and June 22, when she reviewed the photo spread and
first identified defendant, Mrs. Benally acknowledged her mistake
(Tr. I at 185-86).

Stubbs testified that at the meeting Mrs.

Benally was calm and was under no pressure (Tr. I at 185). She
freely explained to him that "[t]he man she was looking at
[White] didn't even fit the description she had just given the
police, and that description was an accurate description and she
realized that she had, in fact, screwed up and the person she had
said —
185-86).

Melvin White —

was not a good identification" (Tr. I at

Thereafter, Mrs. Benally chose defendant's photo from

the photo spread on June 22, positively identified him at the
preliminary hearing on June 25 and at trial on September 3, and
indicated that she was "completely satisfied" and certain that
defendant was the man who had robbed her (Tr. I at 27, 54, 184).
13

She also positively identified defendant's jacket as the one worn
by the robber (Tr. I at 22-23, 55-58).

The jury apparently found

her explanation to be credible, and this Court should not disturb
that credibility assessment.
The record does not support defendant's claim that the
police either affirmatively persuaded or "deliberately and
conscientiously convinced" Mrs. Benally that her identification
of White was mistaken (Br. of App. at 9-10).

Based on his

fifteen years of police work, Detective Stubbs routinely
questioned witness identifications, believing them to be the
weakest link in any case (Tr. I at 113, 118). Moreover, he did
not believe that White specifically fit the description given by
Mrs. Benally over the telephone, he questioned the timeframe for
travel between the location of the robbery and the place where
White was initially detained, and he learned that White had
provided an alibi, which was later corroborated (Tr. I at 116-18,
123, 160). Accordingly, when he first met with Mrs. Benally at
the police station following her initial identification of White,
he questioned the strength of her identification by trying "to
shake" it (Tr. I at 118, 153-54).

He determined that although

she was not positive about her identification, she felt White may
well be the robber (.id. ).

Her discussion with Detective Stubbs

had little, if any, lasting impact, however.

Immediately after

meeting with Stubbs, Mrs. Benally saw White walking down the
hallway of the police station, after which she gave her statement
to the police in which she reiterated that she felt sure that
14

White was the robber (Tr. I at 25-26, 42-45, 48-50, 155}- The
record does not reflect that Mrs. Benally had any further contact
with the police until she met with Detective Stubbs in the
following days and recanted her identification of White.

She was

not informed that the police did not believe that White was
involved or that White had provided an alibi (Tr. I at 52).
Accordingly, defendant's theory of police coersion in the
identification process has no support in the record.
The mere fact that White's photo was not included in
the photo spread does not mean that any credibility accorded Mrs.
Benally's identification of defendant was "unreasonable[.]"3
Neither the police nor the victim believed White was a suspect at
the time the photo spread occurred on June 22, so his photograph
was not included (Tr. I at 160, 181, 183, 185-86).

Mrs. Benally

had seen White twice prior to the photo spread and was fully able
to compare the image of White in her mind's eye with the
photograph of defendant she chose from the photo spread.

The

photo spread was admitted into evidence (Tr. I at 185), and the
jury was allowed to consider the impact the absence of White's
picture may have had on the credibility and weight to be given
Mrs. Benally's identification testimony.

The jury could

reasonably credit Mrs. Benally's identification of defendant, and
3

The record suggests that Mrs. Benally was given an
opportunity to compare White's picture to defendant's at some point
after the June 22 photo spread (Tr. I at 52-53), although Detective
Stubbs testified that he did not show the victim a photo of White
at any time (Tr. I at 181). It is clear that White's photo was not
included in the photo spread conducted on June 22 (Tr. I at 181,
183).
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this Court should defer to that determination.

Wright, 744 P.2d

at 317, 319.
B.

The Remaining Evidence Involves Credibility
Determinations Properly Left to the Jury

The record clearly illustrates that there is no merit
to defendant's claim that the jury was expected to presume his
guilt solely from his "tenuous" identification as the robber (Br.
of App. at 14-15).A

In addition to Mrs. Benally's positive

identification of defendant and his jacket at trial, the jury
also considered Brent Hoth's identification of defendant and his
jacket, Gayle Herrera's testimony regarding the evening of the
robbery, and defendant's spontaneous confession.
Defendant challenges the credibility of Hoth's
identification, arguing that Hoth did not get a good look at the
robber, provided only a general description of the robber and his
jacket to the police, and was not given the opportunity to
compare defendant's photo with one of Marvin White (Br. of App.
at 13-14).

Nothing in the record indicates that Hoth's

identification was hesitant, uncertain, or otherwise unreliable.
At trial, Hoth positively identified both defendant and his
jacket, recognizing that although "you can never be totally
sure[,]" he was "[a]s sure as [he] can be" that defendant was the
person who robbed the Kar Kwik (Tr. I at 62-63, 67-69).

A

He

Defendant's reference to the improper jury instruction
struck down in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S. Ct. 2450
(1979), is irrelevant to this appeal (Br. of App. at 14). The jury
was not instructed that "The law presumes that a person intends the
ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts."
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testified that Mrs. Benally probably had a better view of the
robber than himself because she was closer to him (Tr. I at 6970).

However, he maintained that he got a good look at the

robber from the customer's side of the counter while the robber
was standing next to Mrs. Benally by the cash register on the
other side of the counter (Tr. I at 14, 16-17, 20-21, 62-64, 69).
He also selected defendant's picture from those in the photo
spread conducted six days after the robbery (Tr. I at 68-69, 14546).

The fact that he was not asked to view a man who had been

eliminated as a suspect in the robbery does not render his
identification unbelievable, but is a factor to be considered by
the jury in determining the credibility and weight to be given
Hoth's testimony, as defendant argued to the jury in closing
arguments (Tr. II at 64-66).
The jury did not have to fully credit the
identification testimony of either Hoth or Mrs. Benally in order
to convict defendant of robbery because the remaining evidence
alone more than adequately supports the conviction.

Defendant

minimizes Gayle Herrera's testimony, pointing out that she did
not have any personal knowledge that defendant entered Kar Kwik
on the night of the robbery or that he actually robbed the store
(Br. of App. at 10-11).

Herrera's testimony is fully set forth

in the Statement of Facts, infra, and need only be summarized
here.

Her testimony placed defendant at the scene of the robbery

around the time it occurred after he had used cocaine (Tr. I at
82-83, 85). Approximately six hours after the robbery, she
17

entered the police station and described to Detective Stubbs,
without prompting, details concerning the only robbery to have
occurred in Ogden on June 16, including the location of the
crime, the use of scissors, a description of defendant's
clothing, and a physical description of defendant, all accurately
matching the details of the Kar Kwik robbery and the description
of the robber (Tr. I at 85-89, 91, 93-94, 124). She also
described defendant's car and part of its license plate, both of
which she helped to locate the following day and which were
traced to defendant (Tr. I at 91-93, 125-26).

She later helped

Detective Stubbs locate defendant and verified that he was the
man she was with on June 16 (Tr. at 91-93, 125).
Defendant's trial testimony largely corroborated
Herrera's testimony.

They both testified that they met when

defendant let Herrera use his Cearfield apartment to exchange sex
for cocaine with a drug dealer named Half Pint (Tr. I at 99-100,
189-90; Tr. II at 3-6, 8-9); that, at Herrera's request,
defendant stole Half Pint's money and drugs and sent him back to
Ogden on foot (Tr. I at 100-01, 190-92; Tr. II at 9-10, 14-15,
17-18); that they both used the stolen drugs until they were
gone, then drove around looking for more drugs, making several
stops in Ogden in the process (Tr. I at 85, 89, 102, 192, 194-95;
Tr. II at 18-21); that shortly before Herrera visited Detective
Stubbs, she and defendant had sex, during which Herrera got mad
at defendant and had him drop her off at 25th and Washington in
Ogden, where the police department is located (Tr. I at 86, 9018

91, 102-03, 191-94; Tr. II at 22-23).

However, defendant denied

that they stopped at Kar Kwik and testified that he did not know
Herrera until 3:00 p.m. on June 17 (Tr. I at 191, 195, 204; Tr.
II at 3-4, 29-31).

He gave no explanation for Herrera's ability

to provide the police with his physical description and a
description of his car, his jacket, their meeting, and their
activities together hours before they met. Moreover, defendant
made no attempt to establish his actions on June 16 (Tr. II at
7), relying instead on the general defense that all the witnesses
were lying and he did not commit the crime.
Finally, the spontaneous confession made by defendant
when he was arrested corroborated Herrera's description of
defendant's jacket, his use of scissors, and his use of cocaine
in connection with the robbery.5

The confession, together with

Herrera's testimony, provide ample persuasive evidence from which
the jury could find that defendant had committed the robbery.
The jury had before it substantial evidence connecting
defendant to the crime and establishing defendant's culpability.
Viewed in a light most favorable to the jury verdict, the
evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom provide
overwhelming support for the aggravated robbery conviction.
Hence, defendant's insufficiency claim is without merit.

See

Vigil, 840 P.2d at 794; State v. Boone, 820 P.2d 930, 937 (Utah
App. 1991); State v. Clark, 783 P.2d 68, 70 (Utah App. 1989).

5

The admissibility of the confession is challenged in Point
II, supra, and the substance is set forth at page 20, supra.
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POINT II
THE ARRESTING OFFICER'S BRIEF DISCLOSURE OF
THE BASIS FOR THE ARREST AND THE AUTHORITY
AND PURPOSE BEHIND THE SEARCH WARRANT
CONSTITUTED NEITHER INTERROGATION NOR ITS
FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT; HENCE, ADMISSION OF
DEFENDANT'S SPONTANEOUS PRE-MIRANDA
CONFESSION WAS PROPER
When the police served the search warrant at the
apartment where defendant was staying, Detective Stubbs found
defendant in one of the bedrooms and immediately placed him under
arrest (Tr. I at 128, 132-33, 142, 167-68)-

Stubbs briefly told

defendant who he was and that the officers were from the Ogden
Police Department (Tr. I at 132-33, 142). Stubbs said that he
"was investigating the Kar Kwik robbery at 7th and Washington,
that [defendant] did it . . . [and] that the person driving
[defendant's] car had given him up" (Tr. I at 133, 143, 167-68).
He then explained that he had a search warrant and "was going to
search the house for the coat and the scissors that were used in
the robbery" (Tr. I at 133, 143, 168-69).

At this point,

defendant broke into Detective Stubbs' explanation and
volunteered:
The coat's in the closet. I'm — I was coked
up at the time. I'll plead guilty. I threw
the scissors somewhere, but I don't know
where because I [was] coked up[.]
(Tr. I at 133-34, 143, 169-70).

Detective Stubbs interrupted

defendant to read him his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966) (Tr. I at 135-36, 143, 17273).

Defendant made no further comments (Tr. I at 136-37, 143,

173, 204).
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Defendant contends that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress the post-arrest confession he made
to Detective Stubbs, claiming that the statement was the
involuntary result of custodial police interrogation or its
functional equivalent in violation of Miranda, thereby rendering
the statement inadmissible under both the federal and state
constitutions (Br. of App. at 15, 17-19).
Although defendant's brief refers to both the state and
federal constitution, he did not raise a state constitutional
claim below, offers no basis for independent reliance on or an
expanded reading of the state constitution, and does not argue
that either exceptional circumstances or plain error exist.
Accordingly, this Court need only address the federal
constitution.6

State v. Jensen, 818 P.2d 551, 552 n.2 (Utah

1991) (defendant placed no independent reliance on the state
constitution); State v. Miller, 829 P.2d 132, 135 (Utah App.)
(state constitutional argument regarding admissibility of
confessions was not preserved below and no exception to the
waiver rule was presented on appeal), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383
(Utah 1992); State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 927 n.13 (Utah
App. 1991) (defendant provided no independent state
constitutional analysis); State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327-28
(Utah App. 1989) (defendant failed to raise the state
6

The record indicates that the issue was discussed by the
court and both counsel at the beginning of the trial (Tr. I at 130,
138; a copy is attached as Addendum B). However, the substance of
the discussion was not recorded and no written memoranda on the
issue appear in the file.
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constitutional issue below), rev'd. on other grounds, 805 P.2d
761 (Utah 1991); see, e.g., State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239,
1247 n.5 (Utah 1988) ("As a general rule, we will not engage in
state constitutional analysis unless an argument for different
analyses under the state and federal constitutions is briefed*"),
cert, denied,

U.S.

, 112 S. Ct. 1942 (1992); State v.

Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 805-06 (Utah 1986).
"This Court reviews the factual findings underlying the
denial of a motion to suppress evidence under a 'clearly
erroneous' standard, and reviews the trial court's conclusions of
law based thereon for correctness."

State v. Gray, 211 Utah Adv.

Rep. 40, 41 (Utah App. Apr. 22, 1993) (quoting State v. Brooks,
209 Utah Adv. Rep. 43 (Utah App. Mar. 22, 1993)); see also State
v. Brown, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 6 (Utah Nov. 30, 1992).

The

ultimate question of whether police comment or conduct was, under
the totality of the circumstances, so likely to evoke an
incriminating response that it constituted interrogation under
Miranda is a factual determination, reviewed on appeal for clear
error.

Lavton City v. Aragon, 813 P.2d 1213, 1215-16 (Utah App.

1991); see State v. Singer, 815 P.2d 1303, 1311-12 (Utah App.
1991).

But see United States v. Wauneka, 770 F.2d 1434, 1438

(9th Cir. 1985) (the issue is a mixed question of law and fact).
It is clear that
the prosecution may not use statements,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming
from custodial interrogation of the defendant
unless it demonstrates the use of procedural
safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination. By custodial
22

interrogation, we mean questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S. Ct. at 1612 (footnote omitted).
This is not to say that a failure to give Miranda warnings
immediately upon making an arrest requires suppression of all
post-arrest statements made prior to the Miranda warning.

See

Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 299, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1689
(1980); State v. Wilson, 701 P.2d 1058, 1059 (Utah 1985); State
v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 58, 513 P.2d 422, 425 (Utah 1973);
Araqon, 813 P.2d at 1214-15. Miranda safeguards come into effect
only when a suspect who is in custody is subjected to
interrogation.

Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01, 100 S. Ct. at 1689-90;

Araqon, 813 P.2d at 1214. Absent interrogation, defendant is not
entitled to the Miranda safeguards, and his voluntary, postarrest statements are admissible. Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S.
520, 527-30, 107 S. Ct. 1931, 1935-37 (1987); Innis, 446 U.S. at
302-04, 100 S. Ct. at 1690-91; Wilson, 701 P.2d at 1059; Valdez,
30 Utah 2d at 58, 513 P.2d at 425.7

7

Defendant raises on appeal the voluntariness of his
confession (Br. of App. at 18-19).
Defendant's argument below
focused solely on whether the officer's actions constituted the
functional equivalent of interrogation (Tr. I at 137-40). His
representation to the court that his confession "was in the nature
of a spontaneous kind of remark" does not suggest that he
challenged its voluntariness (Tr. I. at 140). As the issue of
voluntariness was not put before the trial court and defendant does
not argue for any exception to the waiver rule, the issue has not
been preserved for this Court's review. See Gray, 211 Utah Adv.
Rep. at 47 n.5; State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470, 473-74 (Utah App.
1991).
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The record establishes that defendant was in custody at
the time the confession was made (Tr. I at 132-33, 135-37, 14243/ 167-68)/ and that he had not yet received his Miranda rights
(Tr. I at 132-36/ 142-43/ 172). Hence, the issue is whether
defendant was subjected to interrogation by Detective Stubbs
which would render his confession inadmissible.

In denying

defendant's verbal motion to suppress the confession, the trial
court found:
Since this was not in response to
interrogation, and even though it was clearly
a custodial situation, the Court believes
that since it was not in response to
interrogation, the Motion to Suppress is
denied.
(Tr. I at 140; a copy of the ruling is attached as Addendum B ) .
The United States Supreme Court has defined
"interrogation" for Miranda purposes as "express questioning or
its functional equivalent."

Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01, 100 S.

Ct. at 1689-90; Singer, 815 P.2d at 1311-12. Defendant conceded
below that Detective Stubbs' brief explanation of the basis for
the arrest and the presence of the police officers did not
constitute express questioning (Tr. I at 135, 139). The focus,
therefore, is on whether defendant was subjected to the
functional equivalent of interrogation, thereby rendering his
confession inadmissible.
The phrase "functional equivalent" in the Miranda
context refers to "any words or actions on the part of the police
(other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that
the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
24

incriminating response from the suspect."

Innis, 446 U.S. at

301, 100 S. Ct. at 1689-90 (footnotes omitted); Singer, 815 P.2d
at 1311-12. The likelihood of incrimination must be determined
from a review of the surrounding circumstances, focusing on the
defendant's perspective while considering the officers' knowledge
of the suspect's characteristics.

Singer, 815 P.2d at 1311;

Aragon, 813 P.2d at 1215; see also Mauro, 481 U.S. at 527, 107 S.
Ct. at 1935; Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S. Ct. at 1689-90.
Detective Stubbs' conduct was not the functional
equivalent of interrogation but instead was "normally attendant
to arrest and custody[.]"

The verbal exchange at issue occurred

contemporaneously with taking defendant into custody.

The

arresting officer first properly informed defendant of the basis
for his arrest pursuant to statute: suspicion of robbery of the
Kar Kwik on Seventh and Washington in Ogden.

Utah Code Ann. §

77-7-6 (1990) ("The person making the arrest shall inform the
person being arrested of his intention, cause and authority to
arrest him"); see Wilson, 701 P.2d at 1059 (merely providing the
arrestee with the information required by this statute prior to
giving him his Miranda rights does not amount to custodial
interrogation).

Detective Stubbs then explained the authority

and purpose behind the officers' concurrent search of the
apartment.

See Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10 (1990) (contemplating

that, where appropriate, an officer provide notice of his
authority and purpose in executing a search warrant).

Where an

arrest is made in conjunction with the serving of a search
25

warrant by several officers, this brief explanation is not
unreasonable and does not carry with it the "measure of
compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself"
required to constitute the functional equivalent of interrogation
for purposes of Miranda,
1689.

Innis, 446 U.S. at 300, 100 S. Ct. at

Stubbs' brief explanation is not the type of conduct

Miranda is intended to prevent.
Further, Detective Stubbs could not reasonably have
known that his brief, factual explanation would be reasonably
likely to elicit any response from defendant, incriminating or
otherwise.

Defendant offers no insight from his own perspective

to justify his claim that Detective Stubbs' explanation of the
arrest and the search warrant, without more, produced his
confession.8

Defendant testified that he was not under the

influence of cocaine at the time of his arrest (Tr. I at 202),
and he offers no evidence that he was otherwise unusually
susceptible to the officer's brief explanation of the immediate
situation.

Aside from denying that he made the statement (Tr. I

at 202-03; Tr. II at 25-28), defendant claimed at trial that at
the time of his arrest and throughout the search of the apartment
8

His characterization of Stubbs' conduct as accusatory
instead of investigatory confuses the situation at hand with one in
which a defendant challenges admission of pre-arrest statements
(Br. of App. at 18). One of the relevant factors used to determine
whether an individual who has not been arrested has been subjected
to custodial interrogation is whether the investigation has focused
on the accused, i.e., whether the questioning turned from
investigatory to accusatory. See State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 391
(Utah 1986); State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1105 (Utah App.
1990), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), and cert, denied,
U.S.
, 112 S. Ct. 1282 (1992).
26

he rationally continued to assert his innocence in the face of
what he characterized as badgering from Detective Stubbs, and
repeatedly voiced his concern that the officers not destroy his
brother's apartment (Tr. I at 199-203; Tr. II at 25-26).

Nothing

in defendant's testimony provides any basis for finding that
defendant felt compelled to confess because of Stubbs' brief
recitation*
Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that Detective
Stubbs knew that defendant was peculiarly susceptible to a
factual disclosure of the immediate situation.

Defendant had no

police record (Tr. I at 203-04), and the only information about
defendant known to Detective Stubbs prior to the arrest was the
information Herrera had told him the previous morning (Tr. I at
123, 161-62).

While the officer observed that defendant looked

understandably nervous and scared when he was arrested, a factor
generally inherent in arrest situations, nothing suggests that
defendant appeared unusually disoriented or upset (Tr. I at 13334, 170-72)

The officer did not pause to obtain a response to

his explanation but was interrupted by defendant, suggesting that
the factual recitation was not designed to elicit any response
from defendant but rather to briefly inform him of the basic
information necessary to understand the immediate situation in
which defendant found himself.

There is no evidence of the use

of compelling influences or psychological ploys to obtain a
comment from defendant.

Without more, the mere recitation of the

basis for defendant's arrest and the subject of the search is not
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commentary which the police should know is reasonably likely to
prompt an incriminating response from defendant.

See United

States v. Gav, 774 F.2d 368, 379 (10th Cir. 1985) (comment of
police in searching a container that it contained "cocaine, too"
did not constitute a comment which the police "should have known
[was] reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response").
The officer's disclosures were brief, factual, direct,
and not unusually coersive, unnecessarily forceful or in any way
threatening so as to prompt a response from defendant. Hence,
Detective Stubbs' remarks did not constitute interrogation, and
Miranda was not violated.

See Wilson, 701 P.2d at 1059; see also

Mauro, 481 U.S. at 529-30, 107 S. Ct. at 1936-37; Gay;/ 774 F.2d
at 379; Valdez, 30 Utah 2d at 58, 513 P.2d at 425. Accordingly,
defendant's spontaneous confession was admissible, and the trial
court correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress. Mauro,
481 U.S. at 530, 107 S. Ct. at 1937; Innis, 446 U.S. 302-04, 100
S. Ct. at 1690-91; Wilson, 701 P.2d at 1059.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully
requests that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and
-*/

sentence.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this (S/

day of May, 1993.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney/Genera1
r
KRIS C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General
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For the record, we discussed this matter with
the Court at the opening of the trial.

It's with

respect to the area that we're at now in Detective
Stubbs' testimony that he is —

at least the

prosecutor intends to elicit a statement from
Detective Stubbs that ~

that the defendant, Claude

Hayes, allegedly made —

which would certainly be,

by any stretch of the imagination, felt to be
incriminating,
I indicated to the Court at that time that I
felt that the statement was taken in violation of
Miranda.

And the Court made a preliminary ruling,

based upon the representations of the police report
that were made.

And we asked to have this hearing,

at least to clarify it for the record.
And so for that purpose, I'll ask Detective
Stubbs, with the Court's permission, some questions.
THE COURT:

Yes, you may.

EXAMINATION
(Still out of the hearing of the jury.)
BY MR. CAINE:
Q.

John, I'm looking at —

have you got your

handwritten report up there with you?
A.

I do.

Q.

I'm looking at page three —

it says page three

Laurie Shingle, C.S.R.
(801) 399-8510
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once you Mirandized him in the context of this
circumstance that we've just discussed, he made no
further statements concerning his involvement,
allegedly, in the Kar Kvik robbery.
A.

Correct.

Q.

All right.

And no further statements were taken

from him by you at a later date.
A.

Correct.

Q.

In connection with this.
MR. CAINE:

That's all I have, Your

Honor.
Do you have some questions?
MR. DAROCZI: No.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. CAINE:

Having said that, in the

time between that I had, the small time at lunch —
and I didn't get a chance to eat, which I'll discuss
with the Court later

~

THE COURT:

Well, you've been saving

up for that for years.
MR. CAINE:

Yes, I know.

I knew it

wouldn't break your heart, Your Honor.
I had a chance to review the -• what I believe
at least to be —

the current view of the United

States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court in

Laurie Shingle, C.S.R.
(801) 399-8510
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this area.

And I#ll acknowledge that the Court's

preliminary view this morning is accurate to this
extent, and that is that clearly the courts have said
that ^extemporaneous or ~

or expostulative type

statements that are just thrown out are not
considered to be in violation of Miranda.
But these cases also -- particularly Gates
against Illinois which was the big —

the big one

where they talk about making some changes and some
others —

the clear implication is that police

officers need to be very careful in these areas, and
that the courts have the right to look at all of the
totality of what happened and make a decision as to
whether in this case it did violate Miranda.
And I would suggest in this case that while
it's clearly —
Stubbs —

at least as described by Detective

it#s clearly in the nature of —

of

something coming out, not necessarily in response to
a direct question, you do have the other elements
that are significant.

You have a person who's

clearly placed under arrest.

No question about that.

This isn't even a detention situation.

He's under

arrest.
Secondly, he's told, I believe, in effect, you
committed a robbery.

Not only do I believe you

Laurie Shingle, C.S.R.
(801) 399-8510

139

committed it, but I believe you did it with a pair of
scissors and —

and you were wearing a jacket and I'm

here to get them.

You know, and that's why I'm h€

and that's where we are.
Now, while that isn't ~

while that isn't

interrogation, I suppose, in the classic sense, it
certainly is everything else.

You've now got the

suspect there, he's in custody.

He's detained; he's

under arrest.

what happened, what

He's told what —

he's accused of and what he supposedly did it with
and that they're there to get these things.
If that isn't a situation which, in effect, at
that point, a careful reading —

and Detective

Stubbs, I think, honestly says, as soon as he -- as
soon as he says that, I knew I better do this by the
numbers.

And I think that's —

that's a totally

honest statement. As soon as he said that, I stopped
everything rather than let him go on and say
something else.

He then Mirandizes him.

And then ~

then the critical thing here is

once Miranda is given, the defendant stops talking.
And so the issue is, in a careful consideration, and
given the nature of the confrontational
circumstances —

that it clearly was —

while it

might not have been interrogation, it was
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confrontation at that point.

No question about it.

This wasn't just a, well, you may be a suspect, and
then it comes out.
You're it, I'm here, I got you, in effect.
And then a statement is made and then immediately we
go to Miranda.

It seems to me that this does fall

within the gambit of requiring that Miranda should
have been given as soon as that arrest was made and
the defendant was told exactly why they were there.
It's my view then that anything he said
subsequent to that time, even though it was in the
nature of a spontaneous kind of remark, we should
suppress it.

And that's our motion.
MR. DAROCZI:

I'll submit it, Your

Honor.
THE COURT:

Very well.

I don't think it would be appropriate for the
Court to extend Miranda beyond the boundaries that
have been laid down by both federal and state courts.
Since this was not in response to interrogation, and
even though it was clearly a custodial situation, the
Court believes that since it was not in response to
interrogation, the Motion to Suppress is denied.
MR. CAINE:

Thank you.

MR. DAROCZI:

Your Honor, I do
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